I will be examining two types of environmental ethics. The first is a humanistic approach to environmental ethics proposed by Alan Gewirth in which he grounds our duties to the environment in the human rights we owe to successive generations (Gewirth, 2014, 119). The second type is a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics proposed by Paul Taylor in which he argues that humans should follow four rules to cultivate the ultimate virtue of respect for nature (Taylor, 2014, 152-152). After assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each paper independently, I will test these theories against one another and ultimately conclude that we ought to accept Taylor’s virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics. To support this claim, I examine how each theory could be applied to climate change to guide our actions. In response, I will argue that the rule of restitutive justice could temporarily be used to foster a respect for life such that humans work to stabilize wild regions to allow life to flourish with the goal of surrendering these regions to natural systems once the price of climate change has been sufficiently repaid.

Alan Gewirth’s “Human Rights and Future Generations”

In his article, “Human Rights and Future Generations”, Alan Gewirth proposes a theory of environmental ethics grounded in the duties the present generation owes to future generations via human rights (Gewirth, 2014, 119). He argues that human rights are based on reciprocity and thus human rights between generations requires a forward-looking chain of reciprocity in which the present generation tends to the needs of the next generations and the next generation tends to the needs of the generation following them and so on (Gewirth, 2014, 119). With respect to the environment, Gewirth argues that the existence of human rights between generations saddles the present generation with duties to refrain from polluting the environment so that future generations may occupy a world conducive to basic human flourishing (Gewirth, 2014, 119). While the duty to refrain, referred to as a negative duty, imposes a reasonable burden on the present generation, Gewirth cautions that positive duties – duties to provide the future generation with some benefit – may be potentially problematic for the present generation (Gewirth, 2014, 119). To demonstrate this, he provides an example of Stalin’s policies which instrumentalized the present generation with the goal of providing benefits to future generations; these policies were responsible for the starvation of millions (Gewirth, 2014, 119). So, while Gewirth argues that human rights impose duties on the present generation, he takes care to ensure that these duties must not result in the instrumentalization of the suffering of the present generation under the promise of future benefits (Gewirth, 2014, 119-120).

Having established his theory of environmental ethics as following from intergenerational chain of human rights obligations, Gewirth sets out to differentiate his humanistic system of environmental ethics from naturalistic theories of environmental ethics (Gewirth, 2014, 120). Humanistic ethics, like his theory, treat the environment as a means to the end of furthering human interests (Gewirth, 2014, 120). Contra to this theory is naturalistic environmental ethics; naturalistic environmental ethics hold the environment as possessing intrinsic worth that is valuable as an end itself regardless of its contribution to the fulfillment of human interests (Gewirth, 2014, 120-121). Gerwirth notes that the precise source of this intrinsic value can be attributed to several possible features, but the theories hold that this value imposes moral duties on humans to tend to the interests of the environment (Gewirth, 2014, 120-121). Ultimately, Gewirth argues that the fact humans may have duties towards the environment does not prove the environment has rights in itself; he believes these duties may arise due to the ways in which the environment supports human rights by being a good essential to human flourishing that is transferred from one generation to the next. (Gerwirth, 2014, 120-121). In this way, our duties to the environment are a manifestation of our greater duty to protect the human rights of future generations (Gewirth, 2014, 120-121).

Gerwirth’s theory of environmental ethics as subordinate to intergenerational human rights benefits from its appeal to human intuition. As humans are the only moral agents with a duty to the environment, grounding these duties in what we owe to posterity under human rights, on the face of it, seems plausible as the majority of humans would likely feel compelled to protect the environment for the sake of future generations rather than for an elusive sense of inherent worth in the environment itself. Further, it is plausible that the majority of humans would agree that extending the lifespan of the human species would be a worthy endeavour. Gerwirth’s theory is challenged, though, by the fact the human desire to control the natural world through management practices has driven us to an ecological breaking point. This theory would result in the quantification and simplification of diverse ecosystems to a reduced state in the interest of reliably predicting the output of said ecosystem with little concern for how this simplification has enhanced its vulnerability. Further, so long as the natural world occupies a position subordinate to that of humans there exists a sphere in which subpopulations of humans can be reduced to and instrumentalized as was done to the populations discussed in Gerwirth’s examples of Stalin’s policies and slavery (Gerwirth, 2014, 119-120). Though he emphasized the importance of limiting positive duties to future generations, human rights are not irrevocable, and there may be those in power less focused on fair treatment for all and more focused on instrumentalizing as much of the world as they can for their own ends. Given that a humanistic view of environmental ethics both leads to suboptimal ecological conditions and maintains a subordinate position subpopulations may be reduced to – both of which are likely to be accelerated by climate change – Gerwirth’s theory is not capable of producing his desired end of grounding our duties to the environment as a result of intergenerational human rights. Now, we can turn our attention to Paul Taylor’s approach to naturalistic environmental ethics.

Paul Taylor’s “Respect for Nature”

In his article, “Respect for Nature”, Paul Taylor takes a virtue ethics approach to environmental ethics and proposes a theory shaped around individuals fostering the ultimate virtue he refers to as the respect for nature (Taylor, 2014, 152-153). Virtue ethics are a class of ethics focused on cultivating certain virtues and allowing these virtues to inform the right action in each situation (Taylor, 2014, 152). As the ultimate virtue, Taylor argues the respect for nature encapsulates four beliefs: the belief that humans belong to “Earth’s Community of Life”, that all species – including humans – exist within an interdependent system, that all species are centers of life possessing their own inherently valuable teleology, and that humans are not intrinsically superior to other species (Taylor, 2014, 152-152). Taylor argues that to hold these four beliefs is to hold a consistent view of the world and that this view can be characterized by respect for nature (Taylor, 2014, 153).

While these beliefs form a consistent outlook, they do not inform how we ought to act. To account for this, Taylor provides four rules individuals should follow to foster respect for nature. These rules are the Rule of Nonmaleficence, the Rule of Noninterference, the Rule of Fidelity, and the Rule of Restitutive Justice (Taylor, 2014, 153). The Rule of Nonmaleficence states that individuals should not harm any aspect of the natural world, be it an organism, a species population, or a biotic community, possessing its own intrinsically valuable teleology (Taylor, 2014, 153). The Rule of Noninterference states that individuals should not impose constraints on aspects of the natural world that restrict its freedom; similarly, this rule states that individuals should not seek to remove aspects of the natural world from their wild state unless they intend to, and indeed do, return them to their wild state as soon as possible (Taylor, 2014, 155). The Rule of Fidelity prohibits humans from deceiving animals unless a sufficient overriding moral concern justifies the deception (Taylor, 2014, 157). Finally, the Rule of Restitutive Justice holds that if a human transgresses against the natural world, they incur a moral duty to restore the sense of justice between themselves and the wronged party through self-imposed reparations (Taylor, 2014, 159). While this does not provide a complete set of duties for humans to obey – and in Taylor’s view it is unclear whether a complete account of duties could be formulated – they provide a means for humans to foster the ultimate virtue of respect for nature and this virtue, in turn, will work to guide right actions in situations not covered by these rules (Taylor, 2014, 153).

Before moving on to assess Taylor’s theory, it would be beneficial to explore the Rule of Restitutive Justice a bit further to explore how Taylor proposes debts to nature ought to be resolved. The four rules Taylor provides express the ultimate respect for nature virtue under his theory by refraining from instrumentalizing aspects of nature and, instead, treating them as beings pursuing their own ends (Taylor, 2014, 160). In this way, aspects of nature are considered to be moral subjects deserving of fair and honourable treatment by humans as moral agents (Taylor, 2014, 159). In cases where harms were imposed on moral subjects by humans, Taylor argues that humans have a duty to restore the balance of justice regardless of whether there was overriding justification for the offence for even in these cases moral agents have the duty to acknowledge that harm was done even (Taylor, 2014,159;161). He provides examples for what reparation could look like at the three scales mentioned earlier – organismic, species-population, and biotic community (Taylor, 2014, 160-161). For injustices brought upon organisms, Taylor proposes reparation should take the form of restoring the organism, or its beneficiaries, to a state of autonomy equivalent to that of its wild state pre-injustice (Taylor, 2014, 160). In cases where a species population faced injustice, Taylor argues that those at fault should take steps to ensure the permanent protection of the harmed species population (Taylor, 2014, 161). For the final case, if an injustice is done to a biotic community that has destroyed the community, Taylor argues that there are two options (Taylor, 2014, 161). The offending party must either make reparations to a biotic community of a similar type to that of the one destroyed or to a biotic community that requires special attention to avoid being destroyed by human activity (Taylor, 2014, 161).

By avoiding the urge to steer the natural world to a desirable end, something that may be outside of our control, Taylor’s theory of environmental ethics instead opts to let the natural world sort itself out free from perturbations of humans trying to impose their will onto it. The main strength of Taylor’s view is that it lowers the demand on humans from being agents that shape the world to simply meeting the world on its terms and being a part of it in a just and moral way. In this way, his view also works to extricate humans from the argument of liberalism, that the land was given to humans by God and made valuable through our labour, and casts humans as a part of the natural landscape who are duty-bound not to act with moral authority greater than we could hope to acquire. Taylor’s view is challenged, however, by the ambiguity and the deference required by the theory. Virtue ethics requires cultivating the right attitude to confront moral dilemmas; given this, a complete account of duties under a theory of virtue ethics could never be developed as each situation is unique with varying important factors, as Taylor discussed (Taylor, 2014, 153). The fact that navigating moral questions, under Taylor’s theory, would require deliberation to determine the right action and the ongoing practice of cultivating the respect for nature virtue may be more effort than more people are willing to exert. Additionally, Taylor’s theory requires deference and neutrality when viewing interaction between aspects of nature; for example, Taylor, through the Rule of Nonintervention, stipulates that individuals should not act on behalf of the natural world for non-human caused phenomena regardless of the emotional response the phenomena elicits in us (Taylor, 2014, 156). Having discussed both articles and established some strengths and weaknesses of each theory, we can now test these theories against one another.

Discussion

To test these theories against each other, it would be beneficial to see how each would respond to the climate crisis which we currently face. Beyond the immediate distinction between humanistic and biocentric ethics, Taylor’s and Gerwirth’s theories differ with respect to when the benefits are to be realized. Gerwirth’s theory aims to secure human rights for future generations while Taylor’s theory aims to establish a just moral relationship between humans and the natural world. In this way, Gerwirth promotes action that ensures future generations inherit a healthy environment – but only insofar as the cost to the present generation is reasonable (Gewirth, 2014, 119-120). Gerwirth’s theory is justified only if the tension between present duties and secured future benefits is maintained through the forward-looking chain of reciprocity; this is a problem because this chain of reciprocity cannot be maintained indefinitely. First, it assumes humans are infallible when it comes to exerting a control on the environment which we know is not true given the climate emergency and the decline of ecological resilience under narrow-minded management practices. Both phenomena are due to, and worsening from, human industrial and agricultural management practices. Second, it overlooks the disruption a catastrophic event could have on the duties the present owes the future and how this affects the next generation's duties and so forth. For example, there is a fear of climate thresholds that, if passed, would cause the Earth system to undergo a drastic change to find a new stable state. Let us say, for example, an increasing global temperature tips past a threshold that enables rapid permafrost thawing increasing the flux of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere further accelerating the greenhouse effect. This would undoubtedly disrupt agricultural practices causing food shortages globally. In this case, what would that generation's duty be to the next generation? Under Gerwirth’s theory, it does not seem reasonable to blame this generation for using whatever agriculture methods they need to ensure a steady food supply. Further, let us say there is no way to lower the new elevated global temperature; will the following generation receive the same charitability to use what methods they can to maintain a stable food supply? Under Gerwirth’s theory, this seems to be the case as he warned against instrumentalizing the suffering of the present generation to benefit future generations. The result of applying Gerwirth’s theory to the problem of climate change results in passing a deteriorated environment from one generation to the next with the only imperative duty to not leave it worse than you found it. Under these conditions, it is only a matter of time before human rights are threatened and the chain of reciprocity Gerwirth’s theory is hinged upon buckles. Given this, Gerwirth’s theory ought to be rejected due to its failure to reconcile with the human actions that have led us to the current climate crisis. Further, his hesitancy to impose positive duties to improve the environment establishes a chain in which the environment is continually maintained in a minimal sense if not made worse by unforeseen events such as environmental thresholds. Lacking a duty to improve the environment creates the conditions in which the chain of reciprocity established to ensure human rights for successive generations succumbs to increasingly dire environmental conditions. Having found Gerwirth’s theory to be unsuitable, we may now turn our attention to Taylor.

Taylor’s theory of environmental ethics aimed to establish a just existence for humans as part of the natural world. A key component of his theory was the Rule of Restitutive Justice; given that climate change is anthropogenically driven, humans have a duty to the natural world to atone for the climate crisis. At the end of his article, Taylor comments directly on this by saying that all citizens of modern industrial societies incurred this duty through the luxuries afforded to us (Taylor, 2014, 162). How then might we begin to make good on this debt? Taylor’s scenarios of reparations provide examples for injustices against organismic, species populations, and biotic communities, but none of these scales are appropriate for climate change as it threatens the majority of life globally. To account for this, I would refer back to the Rule of Noninterference and the caveat Taylor provided. This rule stated that humans had a duty not to remove aspects of the natural world from their wild state unless they intend to return them to this state and end up making good on this intent (Taylor, 2014, 155). Instead of applying this to a discrete aspect of nature, I would instead apply this to the world at large. In this way, humans could act as agents making good on their duty to account for the harms imposed on the natural world by climate change. There is, however, an important distinction to be made here. I argued that Gerwirth’s theory should be rejected because it failed to reconcile with the fact human management practices resulted in ecological and climate crises and then here argue that humans should act on behalf of the natural world to mitigate harms from climate change. Though both cases involve humans acting on behalf of the natural world, there is a teleological difference given that the end Gerwirth pursues is a human-dominated natural world while the end achieved by applying Taylor’s theory is the stabilization of the natural world with an intent to return it to its wild state. In this way, the virtue of the respect for nature is premised upon a more foundational respect for life as life is essential for wild states to function. Acting in accordance with Taylor’s Rule of Restitutive Justice on behalf of a respect for life to mitigate the harms imposed on the natural world through climate change, while striving toward Taylor’s ultimate virtue of the respect for nature, is the best path forward for us. Having used our moral agency to attempt to extricate ourselves from the natural world and supersede it, we have imposed catastrophic harms on the natural world. It is now our duty to exert our moral agency on the world to mitigate the harms our actions inflicted on it with the ultimate goal of delivering the natural world to a wild state and allowing it to determine its own fate free from our desires.

Conclusion

I examined Alan Gerwirth’s and Paul Taylor’s environmental ethics. Gewirth’s theory grounded our duty to the environment in a framework of intergenerational human rights while Taylor’s theory advocated for individuals to cultivate the ultimate virtue of respect for nature to establish a just relationship between humans and the natural world. I applied each theory to the climate crisis to see how they held up. I concluded that Gerwirth’s theory could not secure the chain of reciprocity that would deliver human rights to future generations. Further, I argued that his aversion to imposing positive duties on the present created the conditions in which a continually worsening environment is passed from generation to generation. After dismissing Gerwirth’s view, I examined how Taylor’s view could respond to climate change and concluded that we ought to adopt Taylor’s theory of environmental ethics. I argued that respect for life precedes the ultimate virtue of respect for nature and thus believe that humans ought to work to stabilize the environment such that it is suitable for life to flourish on its own. The goal of this is for humans to exert control only until harms have been sufficiently repaid; once reparations have been made to the natural world, humans ought to let wild states dictate the natural world. Given that our desire to control the natural world is responsible for the environmental crisis we find ourselves in, it is the duty of humans to return the natural world to its wild state and restore the balance of justice between us and nature.

References

Gewirth, A. (2014). Human Rights and Future Generations. In M. Boylan (Ed.), Environmental Ethics (pp. 118-122). Wiley Blackwell.

Taylor, P. W. (2014). Respect for Nature. In M. Boylan (Ed.), Environmental Ethics (pp. 152-162). Wiley Blackwell.